Abstract: This paper studies the transmission properties of US shocks to six Latin American countries. A model, underlying possible channels of transmissions, is presented and restrictions implied by the model are used to identify shocks. Empirically US shocks are extracted using the new two-step procedure of Canova and De Nicolo' (1999) and treated as exogenous with respect to Latin American economies. The results indicate that US shocks explain variable but signi¯cant proportion of the°uctuations in in°ation, money and the trade balance. The e®ect on output, however, depends on the country. Both terms of trade and interest rate channels play a role in transmission but their relative importance depends on the type of shocks. Furthermore, while comovements of output in response to US shocks are small, comovements of in°ation and nominal balances in response to US shocks are large and positive. Finally, neither the exchange rate regime nor the degree of dollarization matter for the transmission of US shocks to Latin America. Few policy implications are drawn.
Introduction
In the last 20 years several researchers have examined sources of cyclical movements in US economic activity using a variety of techniques. The¯ndings, however, have been often contradictory, see e.g. Blanchard (1989) , King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991), Cooley and Ohanian (1991) , Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) , Gali (1992) and (1999) among others. Interest in the sources of cyclical°u ctuations stems from two di®erent angles. First, researchers engaged in constructing models of the business cycle are interested in knowing whether a small number of disturbances is su±cient to capture the dynamics of the actual data, and in characterizing their typology. Second, policymakers care about what drives the cycle when making day to day decisions about the conduct of monetary and¯scal policy. If, as widely perceived,°uctuations are undesirable and demand shocks are largely responsible, there may be a role for aggregate Keynesian-type policies cushioning the economy. On the other hand, if cyclical°uctuations in economic activity are the optimal response to unforeseen disturbances, rather than mitigating°uctuations per se, a more appropriate role for the government is to reduce economically relevant uncertainties.
For open and/or interdependent economies the question of what generates cyclical movements in economic activity becomes more complicated, since internal and external shocks maybe at work simultaneously and international transmission may occurs via trade in goods or in¯nancial assets. Several authors have tried to distinguished among these factors in the G-7 or OECD economies (see e.g. Amhed, et. al. (1993) , Canova and Marrinan (1998) , Prasad (1999) , Canova and De Nicolo' (2000) ) but the conclusions appear to depend on the assumptions made.
For LDC countries the question of which source (internal vs. external) and which transmission mechanism (common shocks, goods or asset markets) is responsible for cyclical°uctuations becomes crucial in two respects. First, when discussing the sustainability of exchange rate regimes, the literature has often emphasized that asymmetric shocks (both in the sense of being idiosyncratic and of not showing any lagged spillover across countries) can make the task hard, if not impossible. Hence, detecting whether shocks are common and, if they are not, whether internal or external shocks dominate and through which channels are transmitted, may indicate whether e.g., the lack of monetary independence would create imbalances leading to the abandonment of the currency arrangement. Second, in the 1970 and early 1980's, LDC countries typically had autharkic nancial markets and transmission, if any, occurred via changes in the terms of trade and through adjustments in the current account balance. The last 10 years have witnessed a remarkable process of liberalization of domestic¯nancial markets in many LDC countries and a substantial increase of the¯nancial interdependencies with the US. Hence, one would like to know whether shocks are still transmitted through the goods markets or whether¯nancial markets are now the main channle of international propagation.
In this paper we study the extent and the features of the transmission of structural US shocks to Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru. We chose these six countries for several reasons. First, they include both large and small countries in the continent which have both large and small trading ties with the US. Second, they are among the small number of Latin American countries for which it was possible to construct a consistent and coherent data set for macroeconomic variables for a su±ciently long period of time. Third, these countries provide a wide spectrum of experiences as far as monetary arrangements are concerned, covering situations with°e xible rates and no dollarization (Mexico) at one extreme, with complete dollarization (Panama, and starting from the year, 2000 Ecuador) at the other extreme, and intermediate cases (Argentina, Uruguay and Peru) with partial dollarization and di®erent exchange rate arrangements.
Our work is interested in answering four questions. First, we would like to know what is the contribution of US shocks to domestic°uctuations in Latin America. While this question is not new, most of the results currently available are derived identifying external shocks in a nonstructural way. Second, we would like to know whether the transmission of US shocks occurs, if any, via goods¯nancial markets. Third, we would like to construct a set of stylized fact about the comovements of continental macroeconomic variables in response to US shocks. Fourth, we would like to know if the exchange rate regime and the degree of dollarization of the economy matters for the transmission of the shocks. We are particularly concerned here with the transmission of US monetary disturbances and with whether partial or total absence of national monetary policy results in destabilizing movements of other domestic macrovariables.
We present a simple model, integrating the International Business Cycle literature with current models of monetary transmission, which highlights how idiosyncratic shocks in one country are transmitted to another one and we discuss the response of foreign variables to domestic shocks both in°exible and¯xed exchange rate regimes. Besides helping us interpreting the results, the model provides a wealth of sign restrictions which we use to empirically identify US shocks (in the spirit of Canova and De Nicolo' (1999) ). In particular, in this and in many other dynamic structures (temporary positive) supply shocks should positive transitory output responses, negative transitory responses in in°ation and a positive transitory responses in real balances; (temporary positive) real demand disturbances generate positive transitory responses in output and in°ation and negative transitory responses in real balances; and (temporary positive) nominal demand disturbances generate positive temporary responses of output, in°ation and real balances. These sign restrictions will be used to identify shocks that move the aggregate supply, shocks that move the aggregate demand because of changes in the real side of the economy and shocks that move the aggregate demand because of changes in the monetary side of the economy.
For the sample 1983:1-1999:4 our approach extracts one supply disturbance, two monetary disturbances and one shock which is clearly of demand type, but depending on the assumptions made, can be nominal or real. We show that these shocks generate reasonable responses in US variables and that they have easily interpretable time paths. We then feed these shocks as exogenous into VARs for each of the Latin American economy and examine each of the questions of interest in turn.
Four major conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, US shocks are important in accounting for the variability of several domestic variables, including in°ation, money supplies and the trade balance. The e®ect on output depends on the countries and foreign shocks explain between 4 and 46% of its variability. Second, both the terms of trade channel and the interest rate channel play a role in transmitting US shocks to Latin American economies. Their relative importance depends on the type of shocks: supply shocks are primarily transmitted through terms of trade movements, while demand and monetary disturbances appear to feed into Latin American economies primarily through their e®ect on domestic interest rates. Third, the sign, the magnitude and the persistence of the responses of macroeconomic variables to US shocks depends on the type of disturbances we are considering. In general, while Latin American output responses to US shocks are small, in°ation and nominal balances positively comove with US in°ation and nominal balances in response to US shocks. We interpret this¯nding as suggestive of the lack of common output cycles across the continent. Fourth, the exchange rate regime and/or the degree of dollarization of the economy appear not to matter for transmission. The response of domestic nominal balances to US monetary shocks is more persistent for economies which are either partially or totally dollarized, but apart from this it is hard to¯nd regularities which would set apart the two groups of countries. Whether this is due to data problems, short samples, mixture of di®erent exchange regimes or to the presence of a Latin American factor dominating other features we can not tell. Overall, our results suggest the that prospected full dollarization of certain Latin American countries will not be particularly costly, given the current pattern of transmission, and that the sustainability of the arrangement may well depend on the type of shocks which hit the US economy.
Several papers have partially addressed some of the issues we discuss here. For example Agenor, McDermott and Prasad (1999) have documented the properties of cyclical°uctuations in developing countries and compared them to those of developed ones, while Fackler and Roger (1995) , Ho®maister and Roldos (1997) , Prasad (1999) , Amhed (1999) and Amhed and Loungani (1999) study the relative importance of foreign sources of shocks for cyclical°uctuations in selected developing countries. On the other hand, Arora and Cerisola (2000) examine whether and how changes US interest rates a®ect spreads and real variables in developing economies, while Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2000) and Borensztein, Zettelmeyer, Philippon (2000) examine whether variations in US interest rates are transmitted to domestic interest rates in developing countries and whether the transmission properties depend on the exchange rate regime. Similarly, Goldfajn and Olivares (2000) study whether Costarica, Panama and Argentina, three countries with di®erent exchange rate regimes, reacts di®erently to¯nancial and real foreign shocks. The issues surrounding the dollarization of the economy are well summarized in Berg and Borensztein (2000) who also provide some rough calculations of the magnitude of welfare costs and bene¯ts (for calculations based on speci¯c dynamics general equilibrium models see also Cooley and Quadrini (2000) , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000), Mendoza (2000) ). Relative to this literature our work improves in several dimensions. First, we identify external (US) shocks in a structural way, attempt to extract multiple sources of structural disturbances and thoroughly study their transmission properties to a number of Latin American economies. Second, we simultaneously examine the importance of trade and nancial channels in transmitting US shocks to Latin America. Third, instead of reporting simple unconditional correlations, we construct stylized facts on the comovement of macrovariables within the continent exploiting the causal link running from US variables to Latin American ones.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes a model of international transmission. Section 3 presents the speci¯cation of the reduced form model, the procedure used to extract US shocks and the issues connected with the speci¯cation of the model for each country. Section 4 discusses the results of our investigation. Section 5 draws some policy implication and concludes.
A model of international transmission
In this section we describe a model of international transmission which allow us to understand the mechanics of the propagation of domestic shocks to foreign countries. Moreover, such a model provides useful restrictions which we will use to identify the structural shocks from the data. The model mergers two recent strands of literature: one put forward to study international real business cycles and one developed to understand monetary transmission mechanism.
The economy is composed of two countries, each of which is inhabited by a large number of identical agents. We assume that labor is immobile and that each country produces a di®erentiated good with its own technology. Fluctuations are driven by stochastic shocks to productivity, to government purchases of goods and services, and to monetary policy rules.
Preferences of the representative agent in each country i are characterized by utility functions of the form
where
]°°a nd c it ; n it are consumption and hours worked, respectively. We assume that each country specializes in the production of a single good, which we label a in country 1 and b in country 2. Goods in both countries are produced using domestic capital k and domestic labor n, with linear homogeneous production functions. The resource constraints are given by:
where F (k; n) = k µ n 1¡µ , µ is the capital share parameter; y it is the GDP in country i, measured in units of the local good and a it ; b it are the uses of the two goods in country i (so that a 2t are exports from country 1 to country 2 and b 1t are imports from country 2 to country 1); v t = [v 1t ; v 2t ] 0 is a vector of technology disturbances. Consumption, investments and government purchases are composite of foreign and domestic goods:
½ is homogeneous of degree one and ½¸¡1. The elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods is ¾ = 1 1+½ and ! i are weights mesuring the domestic and foreign content of domestic spending. Government purchases g 1t are assumed to be stocastic and¯nanced using period-by-period lump sum taxes T 1t .
Firms rent factors of productions from domestic households: while we treat capital as a credit good, we assume that labor has to be paid in cash before the receipts from the sale of the good are obtained. To meet this requirements¯rms borrow from either from domestic or foreign¯nancial intermediaries or both. Intermediaries collect household deposits and lends them together with the new money that the domestic monetary authority injects every period in the banking system tō rms. The timing of the events is the following: at the beginning of period t, households carry over M it¡1 units of their local currency and choose cash for purchases, Q it , before observing the shocks. Then all shocks are realized, the households take their remaining¯nancial assets (M it¡1 ¡ Q it ) to the banks and the monetary injection, S it , is fed into the banking system in each country. At this point households choose how many hours to work and the amount of capital to rent. The time endowment is normalized to one; capital depreciate at the¯xed rate ±. At the end of production time, households collect wage payments, W it N it , and use them together with the cash set aside, Q it , to purchase consumption goods. After consumption and investment goods are purchased households receive capital income (r it K it ); dividends from owing the¯rms (D it ), the¯nancial intermediaries (F it ) and pay taxes (T it ).
The problem solved by the¯rms in country 1 is
6 subject to the technology producing y 1t and the constraint
where L i 1t are the amount of loans obtained by¯rms of country 1 from banks of country i, R it is the interest rate charged by the banks of country i and e t is the nominal exchange rate in units of units of the currency of country 1 (say, pesos) per units of currency of country 2 (say, dollars). The problem solved by the¯rms in country 2 is similar.
Financial intermediaries maximize pro¯ts from their lending activities, i.e.
where R D it is the interest paid on deposits in country i and Á i is the share of loans made by intermediaries of country i. Operating pro¯ts are distributed to domestic households, who own the intermediaries, at the end of each period.
Since we want to take into account the size of various markets, I denote by º the share of¯rms located in country 1. Equilibrium in the two market requires that the sum of funds supplied in each currency is equal to the demand for loans in that currency from the¯rms in both countries, i.e.
where the superscript s denotes supply.
The monetary authority in each country issues cash at no cost and transfers it to the bank. We assume a simple policy rule, which has both an exogenous and an endogenos component, of the form
and " t , the policy shocks and S t = M t ¡ M t¡1 . Finally, the program solved by the household in each country is to maximize (1) subject to
where M i¡1 ; B i0 are given and E 0 is the expectation conditional on information at time 0. In this economy there are three sources of shocks in each country. We assume that di®erent types of shocks are uncorrelated but that within each class there may be correlation across countries.
, where j½ i j < 1; i = v; g; ".
In equilibrium all markets clear and by the homogeneity of degree one of H that c it + g it + x it = q 1t a it + q 2t b it where q it are the prices of the two goods in the units of the composite good.
is the terms of trade and net exports in country 1 are the de¯ned as nx t = a 2t ¡ T OT t b 1t . Furthermore, pro¯t maximization implies that¯rms they will be indi®erent in taking loans domestically or abroad if (1 + R 1t ) = Etet+1 et (1 + R 2t ), which is an interest parity condition.
Few features of the model deserve some discussion. First, there are three reasons for why international comovements may arise across countries: common shocks, leakages via the goods markets (trade in goods) and via¯nancial markets (lending and borrowing). There is a fourth possible reasons for why comovements may occur, which we can call "contagion", where an expectational error, possibly correlated across countries, and coming from the Euler equation for capital accumation, drives the dynamics of the model. For the moment, however, we will not consider this mechanism of transmission and we will restrict attention to idiosyncratic shocks only. Idiosyncratic shocks in one country alter both the terms of trade and equilibrium domestic nominal interest rate and these changes will a®ect macroeconomic variables in the other country via net export and the interest parity condition. In the second part of the paper we will try to examine which of the two channels of transmission is more important.
Second, we have assumed that trade is in "intermediate" goods and that¯nal goods contain both domestic and foreign intermediade goods. Support for the¯rst assumption comes from Canova and Dellas (1993) and Canova and Marrinan (1998) who showed that transmission via¯nal goods alone is not su±cient to account for the properties of international cyclical°uctations. Support for the second assumption comes from computable general equilibrium models of trade (see e.g. Deardo® and Stern, 1990). Third, we have assumed that banks charge the same interest on their loans regardless of the location of the borrower. This can be easily emended to include pricing-tomarket and/or risk considerations in lending activities which would allow us to address questions concerning movements of risk premium. However, since these issues are outside the scope of this paper, we leave them temporarily aside. Fourth, we have assumed a monetary policy reaction function where the central bank responds to domestic variables and the nominal exchange rate. We will present simulations where the weight on e t is varied from 0 to 10 to mimic a situation of°exible exchange rates (no weight on e t ) and one of¯xed rates (high weight on e t ). Under¯x exchange rate, variation of interest rate in one country are automatically tranferred into variations of interest rates in the other country since the loan market is integrated in this case. Hence, one interest rate will prevail worldwide and the events in the large country determine the nominal rate. Under°exible rates, variations in interest rates are partially absorbed by changes in exchange rates and this will results in reduced transmission of foreign shocks via¯nancial markets.
The dynamics of transmission
To study the features of transmission in this economy we now examine how shocks to productivity, government purchases, monetary rule generated in country 1 are transmitted to country 2 under xed and°exible regimes. Figures 0 and 00 report the responses of nx t ; T OT t ; e t ; R 2t ; y 2t ; ¼ 2t when idiosyncratic shocks to technology, government expenditure and monetary policy occur. Table 1 reports the values of the parameters we use in the simulations (to be added).
The dynamics following a productivity disturbance in country a are standard: a shock in that country increases output, consumption, investment and employment in that country and given that output goods require intermediate goods produced domestically and abroad, net export will become negative and the terms of trade will decrease. As labor productivity increases, the demand for loans from¯rms in country 1 will increase resulting in an increase in the equilibrium domestic nominal interest rate. The direction of the change in the foreign interest rate depends on the exchange rate regime: in a¯xed regime, changes in the domestic rate are matched one-to-one; in a°exible rate both the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate will adjust and the exchange rate will depreciate to maintain interest parity. The e®ect on output and in°ation of the foreign country depends on the details of the technology to produce¯nal goods: when domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitute, both output and in°ation will decrease as resources are shifted to country 1.
The e®ects of a shock to government purchases in country 1 is also standard. Idiosyncratic temporary shocks of this type crow-out private domestic investments and increase employment via a wealth e®ect. Since the production of output goods require intermediate goods produced domestically and abroad, net export will turn negative and the terms of trade will decrease. Since the real wage falls, unit labor costs decrease as the amount of loans demanded by¯rms of country 1. This implies that the equilibrium nominal rate in country 1 will fall and the equilbrium nominal rate in country 2 will also fall, while the exchange rate will appreciate if°exible rates are allowed. Output and in°ation in country 1 will increase if domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitute while the opposite will occur if goods are perfect substitute.
Finally, contractionary monetary shocks in country 1 produce a liquidity e®ect increasing domestic rates. As long as foreign¯rms are allowed to borrow in domestic markets this implies that also foreign interest rates will decline and the exchange rate will appreciate to maintain interest parity satis¯ed. Increases in the cost of production imply contractionary e®ects on domestic output of intermediate goods and this will in turn produce a surplus in the trade balance and an increase in the terms of trade. The behaviour of output and in°ation in country 2 once again depends on the sustitutability of domestic and foreign inputs in the production of¯nal goods. Under imperfect sustitutability, both output and in°ation will increase.
In conclusion, there are two main channels through which all three shocks are transmitted across countries: the terms of trade channel and the interest rate/exchange rate channel. With the parametrization we have used it appears that the terms of trade respond more strongly to technology than to the other types of disturbances. However, interest rate/exchange rate channel appears to be important in the international transmission of demand disturbances.
The identifying restrictions
The model provides a wealth of sign restictions which can be used to identify shocks in our empirical work. None of these restrictions however, comes in the form of zero contraints either on the impact or the long run multipliers. Hence standard identi¯cation schemes based on exclusion restrictions are inconsistent with the basic features of this economy (see also Canova and Pina (1999) ). The restrictions that the model possesses are of conditional type and involve the sign of the responses of certain variables to shocks. For example, we have seen that following a domestic technology shock domestic output and domestic in°ation will move in opposite directions; domestic output and domestic nominal interest rates will move in the same directions and nominal interest rates will be positively correlated across countries. Note that in response to the other two shocks the comovements of these variables may have di®erent sign. Hence, by schrewdly selecting pairs of variables, structural shocks can be identi¯ed in the data by looking at the sign of their cross correlation function in response to shocks. In what follows, and given the nature of the US economy, we employ restrictions on domestic variables only. Figure 1 presents the theoretical pairwise cross correlation function of output, in°ation and real balances conditional on the three type of shocks in that country. It is easy to see that in the model technology disturbances imply negative cross correlations between output and in°ation while the other two shocks imply a positive cross correlation between these two variables. On the other hand, the cross correlation of output and real balances will be negative for government purchases shocks and positive for monetary disturbances. It is worth stressing that these types of restictions are very general and are generated also by models with di®erent microfundation (see Canova and De Nicolo' (1999) for examples of this type).
The speci¯cation of the empirical model
To thoroughly address the question of the transmission of shocks, it is necessary to specify international models where contemporaneous and lagged feedbacks could be simultaneously accounted for. Although there are attempts in this direction (see Canova and Ciccarelli (1999) , Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2000) ) the task is unfeasible in our context for several reasons. First, the quality of the data for Latin America countries is debatable and it is only in the 1990's there has been an e®ort to harmonize the collection and the de¯nitions with OECD standards. Second, hyperin°ations, currency and exchange rate crises are common episodes in Latin America and this makes some domestic time series not only non-stationary but also hardly representative of those situations one would like to examine in discussing the international transmission of shocks. Third, a robust examination of existing interdependencies requires somewhat "regular" cycles and, given the short time series of data available, degrees of freedom restrictions prevent any reasonable multicountry speci¯cation.
For all these reasons we proceed on bilateral basis with the US on one side and one Latin American country at a time on the other, eschewing from the analysis any possible interdependence within Latin American economies. In this setup any correlation between US and Latin American variables is likely to be unidirectional, going from the US to the other country. If this is the case, the speci¯cation and the estimation of the statistical model could be signi¯cantly simpli¯ed. To verify this hypothesis we run a VAR for each of the country-US pair and examine whether the US block is exogenous with respect to the block of domestic variables. Con¯rming a-priori expectations, the null hypothesis that current and lagged values of Latin American variables have zero coe±cients in the US block is not rejected. Given this result, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate a reduced form model with US variables and identify structural shocks. Here we employ the procedure recently developed by Canova and De Nicolo' (1999) to sort out the informational content of reduced form residuals 1 . Second, we estimate a reduced form model for each of the countries under consideration, taking as exogenous the time series for the US structural shocks we have constructed. Our interest will be in measuring the magnitude, the direction and the persistence of the response of Latin American variables to identi¯ed US shocks and in comparing these responses across the countries in the continent.
Measuring US Shocks
The reduced form model for the US economy we use is an unrestricted VAR including a measure of real activity (IP), of in°ation (INF), of the slope of the term structure of the nominal interest rates (TERM) and of real balances (M/P). The sample covers quarterly data from 1983:1 to 1999:4; all series are seasonally adjusted and are obtained from the IFS tape.
Reduced form VAR models, which include real activity, in°ation and measures of interest rates and money have been frequently used in the literature (see e.g. Sims(1980) ; Farmer (1997) ). In addition to a standard measures of industrial production and CPI in°ation, here we employ the slope of the term structure, because of its higher predictive power for real activity and in°ation relative to a single measure of short-term interest rates, and real balances. This variable is used because it allows us to distinguish monetary from other types of real demand disturbances. Note also that the slope of the term structure has information about nominal impulses that other important macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment or real wages, may not have. Visual inspection of the linearly detrended time series shows that there is no compelling evidence of non-stationarities in the four variables. For a VAR model with (detrended) log output, in°ation, slope of the term structure and real balances, both the Akaike and Schwarz criteria indicate that the dynamics are well described by a VAR(1).
To identify structural shocks from reduced form residuals we proceed in two steps. First, we construct innovations having the property of being serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated. Second, we use the restrictions imposed by theory to tell us whether any of the components of the orthogonal innovation vector has a meaningful economic interpretation. Appendix A describes in detail the technical issues involved with the approach. In practice, the process of identi¯cation requires computing the pairwise cross correlation function of the variables of interest in response to the uncorrelated shocks we have constructed and checking if the sign restrictions imposed by theory are satis¯ed. Notice that it is possible that not all the shocks are identi¯ed (i.e. not all sign restrictions are not simultaneously veri¯ed) or that more that one shock is of one type (e.g. two monetary shocks could be identi¯able out of four). This re°ect the fact that sign restrictions provide only bounds in the identi¯cation process and that in a small VAR system identi¯cation may be incomplete, in the sense that with four variables may be impossible to distinguish between say, money demand or money supply shocks, or shocks that a®ect Federal Funds Market or the loans market.
There are several di®erence between the identi¯cation approach used here and the one commonly used in structural VARs (SVAR). In SVAR one typically imposes "economic" or "sluggish" zero restrictions on impact coe±cients or on the long run multipliers of shocks and interprets the resulting long run (short run) dynamics. The imposition of economically or informationally motivated zero restrictions achieves two goals at once: disentangle the reduced form shocks and make them structurally interpretable. The two-step approach we propose separates the statistical problem of producing orthogonal shocks from the economic one of interpreting them. Furthermore, instead of imposing zero restrictions on the contemporaneous impact of shocks, restrictions which may be inconsistent with a large class of general equilibrium models (see Canova and Pina (1998) ), or on their long run e®ects, for which small sample biases may be substantial (see Faust and Leeper (1997) ), we use sign restrictions on a vector of cross correlations to assign a structural interpretation to orthogonal disturbances.
Figures 2-4 present, respectively, the estimated cross correlation function for in°ation and industrial production, in°ation and real balances and real balances and industrial production, conditional on the four orthogonalized VAR innovations for r = ¡4; : : : ; 0; 1; : : : ; 4; the impulse response of the variables of the system to each orthogonal innovations; and the time path of the four disturbances.
The orthogonalization we have selected satis¯es the sign restrictions on the contemporaneous crosscorrelation for a wide range of leads and lags and allows us to identify all four shocks. Figure 2 shows that the¯rst and the third orthogonal shocks generate positive pairwise contemporaneous cross correlations functions over the relevant range and therefore qualify as "monetary" disturbances. The second orthogonal shock produces cross correlation functions for in°ation and output and in°ation and real balances with negative contemporaneous values, and a positive contemporaneous cross correlation function for real balances and output. Hence, this shock quali¯es as a "supply" disturbance. The informational content of the fourth orthogonal shock is less clear: it produces a positive cross correlation function between industrial production and in°ation and therefore quali¯es as demand disturbance. However, the sign of the cross correlation function for the other two pairs of variables depends on whether contemporaneous, leads or lags values are used and there is a range of values for which the cross correlation function of real balances with output or in°ation is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Lacking any better way to call it, we label it "demand" disturbance. Figure 3 shows that the two identi¯ed monetary disturbances have distinct e®ects on real activity, in°ation and the slope of the term structure. The¯rst monetary shock produces sizable responses of industrial production (median contemporaneous impact 0.80) and of real balances. These increases are associated with temporary increases in in°ation and in the slope of the term structure (which increase by 300 basis points on impact). The second monetary disturbance does not have signi¯cant short run real e®ects, but the impact response of in°ation is strong. Furthermore, this disturbance makes the slope of the term structure decline for about two years after the shock. Since also output declines over this interval (through level is -0.08), it may be reasonable to suspect that long term rates have increased relative to short term ones, suggesting the presence of strong expected in°ation e®ects.
The second orthogonal (supply) shock produces a small increase in industrial production accompanied by a decline in in°ation on impact, but this tendency is quickly reversed with in°ation increasing and output declining for about four years. Real balances increase in response to the disturbance and long term rates increase relative to short term ones. Over the adjustment path there is some overshooting and eventually in°ation falls relative to its trend and industrial production increases. The adjustments produced by the fourth orthogonal shock appear to be those typically associated with a real demand shock: contractionary shocks of this type make industrial production, in°ation and real balances decline on impact and the short term rate falls relative to the long term one. Figure 4 shows that the volatility of the¯rst shock (monetary) is approximately constant over the sample except for two large movements in 1984 and 1987. This shock also displays signi¯cant negative movements at the so-called Romer and Romer dates, periods where the Fed pursued contractionary monetary policy actions. The third shock (monetary) shows a period of higher volatility between 1983 and 1990. In particular, we observe a negative spike at the time of the Plaza agreement (1985) and in the last quarter of 1986. After that date the volatility seems to decline even though the persistence appears to increase. The second shock also displays a decline in volatility after 1990, but no tendency for serial correlation to increase. Fluctuations larger than usual in this series occur in 1985 and 1987 (positive) and end of 1986 and 1989 (negative). Note that this last negative e®ect occurred in conjunction with a major stock market crash. The fourth orthogonal shock has one large positive spikes around 1984 and a negative one in 1986, both of which seemed to be associated with substantial changes in consumer and government spending. Also this shock displays a decline in volatility after 1990.
In sum, our identi¯cation approach recovers two monetary disturbances, one supply disturbance and one demand disturbance whose historical path is reasonable and which produce dynamics which are structurally interpretable. Our next task is to examine whether and how these US structural shocks are transmitted to Latin America economies. We address four questions. First, we would like to know whether these shocks have any signi¯cant in°uence on Latin American macro variables. In other words, we are interested in knowing if movements in domestic macroeconomic variables are primarily due to external or internal disturbances. Second, we would like to know whether structural US shocks are transmitted to domestic macroeconomic variables primarily through relative price changes (terms of trade e®ects) or through changes in interest rates (¯nancial e®ects). Third, we would like to know whether there is a continental business cycle in the sense that US and Latin American variables comove in response to shocks. Fourth, we are interested in knowing if the pattern of transmission depends on the exchange rate regime adopted by the country. In particular, we are curious as to whether the responses to shocks of countries which are partially or totally dollarized di®er from those in countries where national currencies are used.
The Latin America response to US shocks
The reduced form model used for latin american economies is a VARX model where the interdependencies among domestic variables are unrestricted, while estimated US structural shocks enter exogenously in the speci¯cation. Formally, the model we use has the form:
where ®(`) = ® 1`+ : : : ® p`p¯(`) = 1 +¯1`+ : : :¯q`q; ±(`) = 1 + ± 1`+ : : : ± r`r , e t are the structural US shocks which are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error u t , i.e. u t je t » (0; -) and Z t are variables capturing worldwide events. Our interest centers in the polynomial¯(`) which measures the response of domestic variables to foreign shocks. In what follows we present 68% bands for the e®ects of each of the four shocks at steps from 0 to 12 computed using a Monte Carlo exercise 2 .
The sample we use covers quarterly data for the 1990's since it is only for this period that a consistent quarterly data set can be obtained. All variables are from the IFS data base except when noted. All series are preliminarily linearly detrended and deseasonalized with a set of deterministic dummies. We consider measures of log detrended manufacturing production in all countries except Ecuador where we use a quarterly GDP series 3 , detrended CPI in°ation, log detrended M1, detrended ratio of exports to imports, detrended terms of trade (not available for Uruguay and Panama) and a measure of domestic interest rates. When available short term market rates are used. Otherwise, we use deposit rates for 3-6 months. Two variables are included in Z t , an index of world commodity prices and Brady bond series, an index measuring the value of outstanding debt of emerging countries.
The countries we consider in this study are: Mexico, Uruguay, Peru', Argentina, Ecuador and Panama. These countries have di®erent trade links with the US (see table 1 ) and therefore may not uniformly respond to shocks that a®ect good markets in the US. However, all these countries have reasonably large¯nancial links with the US and this justi¯es our interest in treating them as a group. Note also that these countries have experienced di®erent exchange rate regimes over the sample under consideration (see appendix B for a brief summary of the regimes in the 1990's) and that they span a wide spectrum regarding the level of dollarization of their economies: Mexico is not dollarized, Uruguay and Peru' are partially dollarized (about 30-40%), Argentina is heavily dollarized (60-70%), Ecuador has been heavily dollarized throughout the 90's, and since the beginning of the year 2000, is totally dollarized; Panama was dollarized for the entire period under consideration.
In a study like ours which tries to examine the "normal" transmission of shocks currency , balance of payments and other type of crises pose a problem since they may severely distort the results obtained in normal times. Furthermore, since some countries switched exchange rate regime over the sample the results may be statistically insigni¯cant simply because we are combining periods which are structurally di®erent. Unfortunately, given the shortness of the sample, there is no way of controlling for these factors, but one has to keep all these considerations in mind when interpreting the results.
According to the model of section 2, one should expect transmission of shocks across countries to occur for three reasons: because shocks are common and/or because they a®ect either goods or nancial markets. While the¯rst source of transmission is excluded here a-priori by the assumptions underlying the identi¯cation scheme, both goods and asset markets may play some role in our context.
We have seen that the four US shocks a®ect both US in°ation and US interest rates contemporaneously. Hence, we should expect both channels of transmission to play a role in our study. However, their relative importance may have changed over time since in many countries the process of¯nancial liberalization took place only in the last decade. In the end it should be possible to link the relative importance of the two channels to the evolution over time of trade shares, exchange rate regimes and integration of¯nancial markets (measured by the correlation of interest rates in the US with US denominated interest rates in Latin America).
The Results
First, we examine the contribution of foreign shocks to the variability of domestic variables in each of the six countries. In particular, we are interested in measuring the relative contribution of domestic and foreign factors to the°uctuations in output, in°ation, money and the trade balance. We do so by computing the R 2 of a regression of these variables on current values and two lags of the US shocks. Table 3 
Channels of Transmission
Which channel is more important in transmitting US shocks to Latin America? It turns out that the answer depends on the type of shocks we are considering. In response to supply shocks terms of trade move signi¯cantly in all countries with one-two quarter lags, although the sign of the responses depends on the country, while interest rates do not often move in a signi¯cant way. In the three cases when they do, they decline strongly and persistently in Panama, while in Mexico and Ecuador the e®ect is short lived. Since positive realizations of this type of shock reduce US interest rates, one should expect countries which are su±ciently integrated with the US and for which this does not happen to face exchange rate pressures.
When a (contractionary) demand shocks hit the US economy, terms of trade move for a short time but the direction across is not robust across countries (in Peru', contrary to the logic, terms of trade signi¯cantly increase). Domestic interest rates, on the other hand, increase in response to the shocks in all countries except for Uruguay, where they persistently decline. The response is persistent and lasts up to 8 quarters, except in Argentina. Since US interest rates decline in response to shocks, interest rate parity conditions indicate that Uruguay will face strong exchange rate pressures when shocks of this type hit the US economy.
One of the two monetary disturbances appears to be transmitted through both channels. Expansionary realizations of this shocks make terms of trade signi¯cantly decline, as one would expect, in three countries but the e®ect is short lived. Interest rates also change. In general, following a disturbance which generates domestic liquidity e®ects, Latin American interest rates persistently decline. The exception is Uruguay, where the interest rate does not signi¯cantly move. Note that in Argentina and Panama, two of the most dollarized economies, the median e®ect is approximately of the same magnitude as the one experienced in the US. The other monetary shocks a®ecting the US economy generate small and short lived international e®ects. An expansionary shock of this type makes terms of trade in decline Mexico and Argentina, but the magnitude is small and the decline is signi¯cant only for one period, while in the other two countries the e®ect is insigni¯cant. The responses of interest rates are, by and large, small and insigni¯cant: the only signi¯cant responses are in Argentina, where interest rates temporarily and decrease, and in Ecuador, where they perversely increase for about a year.
To summarize, both channels play a role in transmitting at least three of the four US shocks we have identi¯ed to Latin America. The terms of trade channel appears to be more important in the transmission of US supply disturbances while the interest rate channel is stronger when we consider the demand disturbance and of one of the monetary disturbances. In general, the sign of the responses of both the terms of trade and interest rates for most countries is consistent with the idea that they adjust to maintain equilibrium in international goods and asset markets.
Stylized Facts about transmission
The second question of interest concerns the adjustments induced in Latin American economies by US shocks. Once again, both the direction and the magnitude of the changes depend on the type of shocks we examine.
Recall that a positive US supply shocks induces positive responses in US output and US real balances and negative responses in US in°ation and interest rates. Internationally, such a shock has little e®ects on output: in Argentina, Mexico, Peru' e Panama there is no signi¯cant response; in Ecuador there is a signi¯cantly positive but short lived e®ect (just one period) and in Uruguay the e®ect is signi¯cantly and perversely negative but it dies out quickly. The lack of signi¯cant output responses is somewhat surprising, given that it is shared by countries which have both large and small trade shares with the US and are either very small or relatively large in the continent. The e®ect on nominal balances is positive in four countries (Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador and Uruguay) but it is temporary, while in the other two countries no signi¯cant e®ect is visible. In°ation decline in all countries but Ecuador: the decline is signi¯cant for one (or two) quarters only and the magnitude varies with the country. Finally, the trade balance responds signi¯cantly in four of the six countries. The sign of the e®ect however is negative, indicating that imports increase more than export, and this fact is consistent with the negligible e®ect on domestic output we have noted above. The change is limited to one quarter, except in Uruguay, and it is, in general, small.
The response of Latin American macrovariables to a US demand shock are, in general, small and not very signi¯cant. Recall that a contractionary shock of this type makes output, in°ation, short rates and real balances contemporaneously decline in the US, even though in°ation and real balances become positive after the initial impact. Latin American output responses are negligible except in Argentina, where a signi¯cant decline for two periods is observed, and Peru, where output signi¯cantly increase with one quarter delay. In°ation responses are signi¯cantly positive in Argentina and Peru', but only for a short while, and in Ecuador, where the increase is delayed by about 1 year. The behavior of in°ation in these three countries is hard to explain, especially considering the response of nominal balances, which decline signi¯cantly in all 6 countries. Apparently, in countries which have experienced episodes of uncontrolled in°ation, negative foreign demand shocks tend to destabilize the economy. Finally, the trade balance increases signi¯cantly only in Argentina, Uruguay and Panama. Surprisingly, the e®ect lasts at least a year, suggesting a large decline of US imports in these countries.
A US monetary shock, when positive, instantaneously increases US output, in°ation and real balances and makes short term rates decline. The¯rst of such shocks has a strong e®ect on nominal balances all over Latin America: the response is positive, strong and independent of the exchange rate regime the country is in. The magnitude and the persistence of the e®ect depends on the country: the shorter response is in Peru, where money signi¯cantly increases for two quarters; the longest is in Uruguay, where nominal balances are above the trend for more that three years. The responses of the other three macroeconomic variables are less similar across-country. Output responds positively in two cases, negatively in two cases and in the remaining two no signi¯cant movements can be observed. Also, in terms of persistence, the results are mixed: for example, in Peru and Argentina the e®ects die out quickly, while in Uruguay and Ecuador the e®ects are much more persistent. In Argentina, Ecuador and Peru' in°ation is, once again, moving in the wrong direction, declining with one period delay even though the magnitude is small; in Mexico in°ation increases for up to six quarters and in the other two countries no signi¯cant e®ect is found. Finally, the trade balance declines in four countries after the shock. The persistence of the response varies but, in every country, the shock appears to be completely absorbed after about 6 quarters.
The other monetary shock has small repercussion in Latin America and in the majority of cases the responses are insigni¯cant. In a few cases responses are signi¯cant and persistent (see e.g. the responses of output in Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, the trade balance in Panama and Peru, nominal balances in Ecuador and Uruguay). However, it turns out that there is no coherent pattern in the responses across countries and the joint responses of output, in°ation and nominal money hard to interpret.
To summarize, the responses of macroeconomic variables are, in general, coherent with the theoretical expectations. The magnitude and the signi¯cance of the changes depends, to some extent, on the type of shocks and on the country. Latin America output does not react strongly to US shocks. This is not due to the fact that we employ measures of industrial production, which may be covering only a small percentage of national output. In fact, if we substitute GDP for industrial production in those countries where quarterly data exist, no changes emerge. Hence, there is very little evidence of a continental output cycle, generated in the US and transmitted to Latin America. This con¯rms the indirect evidence of Loayza, Lopez and Ubide (1999), who show that in Latin America, country speci¯c factors dominate the variability of sectorial output. The trade balance responds to US shocks but it is because Latin American import are more procyclical than Latin American export. This is true also for a country like Mexico where a large share of the import-export activity is with the US. A pattern of this type is consistent, for example, with US¯rms decentralizing production in good times and bring it back to US in bad times. Nominal balances are highly positively correlated with US nominal balances in response to all US shocks. Hence, in Latin American the supply of nominal balance behaves as if each country was implicitly following a currency board agreement, with the domestic supply of money increased every time the US money supply exogenously or endogenously increase. In°ation rates are also highly correlated with US in°ation in response to all US shocks. However, there are three countries (Argentina, Peru and Ecuador) where in°ation responses are perverse and demand and monetary shocks which increase (decrease) US in°ation cause in°ation in these countries to decline (increase). Whether this is due to incorrect expectations, poor data or hyperin°ation dynamics is di±cult to say.
In conclusion, while Latin American¯nancial and money markets react signi¯cantly to US shocks this is not necessarily the case of goods markets (see table 4 and 5 for details) In particular, Latin American output°uctuations appear to be uncorrelated with US shocks and driven, to a large extent by local, idiosyncratic shocks.
Does the exchange regime matter?
We turn to the last question of interest in this paper: whether the exchange rate regime and/or the level of dollarization of the economy makes a di®erence in the transmission properties of US shocks. Theoretically, one should expect transmission to be stronger in countries which use¯xed exchange rate or currency board regimes but this prediction needs to be quali¯ed to take into account the level of integration of the various economies with the US. Our results do not provide an informative answer to this question. We have seen that output in Latin American countries does not react to signi¯cantly to US shocks and this is true regardless of whether the economy is under one regime or another. Also, money and prices comove substantially with US money and prices in response to shocks, regardless of the exchange rate arrangement used. In the cases of monetary shocks, nominal interest rates react quickly and more signi¯cantly in Argentina and Panama-the two most heavily dollarized economies in the period -than in the other countries but, apart from this e®ect, there is no other evidence supporting the idea that the exchange rate regime matters.
One reason for these results is clearly the fact that in many countries several exchange rate regimes were experienced in the sample. Although the e®ects of shocks di®er across regimes, di®erences may be blurred when the sample mixes episodes with di®erent regimes. One other reason for why the results are not very informative about di®erences across exchange rate regimes is that some of the countries experienced currency crisis within the sample. These events were accompanied by domestic measures which may have severely altered the normal transmission process. We have tried to account for these episodes with variables included in the vector Z t but given that crises times dominate in terms of variability non-crises times, failure to separate the responses across regimes may be due to the presence of these outliers. Finally, it may well be that the magnitude of the di®erences is small and the short sample period makes them look as if they were statistically insigni¯cant.
Conclusions and some policy implications
This paper studies the extent and the features of the transmission of structural US shocks to Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru. We identify structural shocks in the US using the two-step procedure of Canova and De Nicolo' (1999) which¯rst extract orthogonal innovations from a reduced form model and then studies whether their informational content agrees with the one contained in theoretical model provided in section 2. The basic intuition used to identify structural disturbances is that (temporary positive) domestic supply shocks should generate positive transitory domestic output responses, negative transitory responses in idomestic n°ation and a positive transitory responses in domestic real balances; (temporary positive) real domestic demand disturbances should generate positive transitory responses in domestic output and doemstic in°ation and negative transitory responses in domestic real balances;¯nally, (temporary positive) domestic nominal demand disturbances should generate positive temporary responses of domestic output, doemstic in°ation and doemstic real balances. For the sample 1983:1-1999:4 our approach extracts one supply disturbance, two monetary disturbances and one shock which is clearly of demand type, but depending on the assumptions made, can be of nominal or of real type. We show that these shocks generate reasonable responses in the variables of the system and that they have easily interpretable time paths.
We feed these shocks as exogenous into VAR models for each of the Latin American economy and measure the contribution of these disturbances to the variability of domestic variables. Then we examine the importance of di®erent channels of transmission, collect a set of stylized fact on how various types of shocks impact in the economies and sort out their magnitude and their persistence by exchange rate regimes and/or the level of dollarization of the economies.
Four major conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, US shocks are important in accounting for the variability of in°ation, money and the trade balance. The e®ect on output depends on the countries and foreign shocks explain between 4 and 46% of output variability. Second, both the terms of trade channel and the interest rate channel play a role in transmitting US shocks to Latin American economies. Their relative importance however depends on the type of shocks: supply shocks are primarily transmitted through terms of trade movements, while demand and monetary disturbances appear to feed into Latin American economies primarily through their effect on domestic interest rates. Third, the sign, the magnitude and the persistence of the responses of macroeconomic variables to US shocks depends on the type of disturbances we are considering. In general, while output responses to US shocks are small and have low correlation with output movements in the US, in°ation and nominal balances positively comove with US in°ation and nominal balances in response to US shocks. We interpret this¯nding as suggestive that increased nancial integration experienced over the 1990's has not produced more syncronicity in continental output cycles. Fourth, there is no evidence that the exchange rate regime and the level of dollarization of the economy matters for transmission. The response of domestic nominal balances to US monetary shocks is more persistent for economies which are either partially or totally dollarized, but apart from this it is hard to¯nd regularities which would set the two groups of countries apart. Given the data set we have available we can not say whether this is due to data problems, short samples, the use of a mixture of di®erent exchange regimes or to the presence of a Latin American factor dominating the importance of the monetary arrangement used.
Based on the evidence we have collected, is it a good idea to dollarize Latin America? The question is currently at the forefront of the policy debates since some of the countries in our sample have contemplated in adopting or already adopted the dollar as their currency (El Salvador being the latest example). The existing literature has highlighted two aspects which are relevant here: the costs that such a measure would impose on a country when it gives up the ability to use monetary instruments to respond to internal and external shocks and the sustainability of the arrangement.
In terms of the costs of giving up monetary policy, we have noticed that the response of money to US shocks in the six Latin American countries is very highly correlated with the response of US money. This is true to such an extent that it looks as if Latin American Central Banks implicitly target domestic nominal balances to US nominal balances. This is waht Calvo and Reinart (2000) have call "fear of°oating". For those countries for which we have data, it looks as if the responses of Latin American reserves are negatively correlated with US nominal balances therefore supporting this hypothesis. If this is the case, domestic stabilization does not appear to be a crucial concern of central banks in Latin America and the costs of going to full dollarization may be small.
In discussing the sustainability of the arrangement the literature has stressed that the feasibility of currency areas crucially depends on the presence of comovements in the macroeconomic indicators have across countries. In particular, a¯xed exchange rate regime will be more easily substainable if shocks are internationally contemporaneously correlated or if there is a quick transmission of shocks from one country to another. Dollarization imposes a further constraint on this picture as local currency varies only to the extent that "dollars' enter the country.
The model we have presented suggests that changes in the exchnage rate depend on the interest rate di®erential across countries. The evidence we have presented suggests that shocks that a®ect US interest rates do not necessarily produce changes in Latin American interest rates of the same magnitude. Furthermore, the adjustment in Latin American interest rates is in the right direction for some shocks but not others. Hence, the sustainability of a currency board or a full dollarization may well depend on the types of shocks that hit the US economy. Since interest rates signi¯cantly moves in response to to demand or monetary shocks but not so much in response to supply shocks, discovering which of these sources is dominant in the US economy may provide useful information on whether the dollarization of these economies will be substainable or not.
This appendix describes the technical details involved with the identi¯cation of US shocks. Let the MA representation of the VAR system for the US be:
where Y t is a 4 £ 1 vector and B(`) a matrix polynomial in the lag operator. An orthogonal decompositions of the MA representation with contemporaneously uncorrelated shocks featuring unit variance-covariance matrix is of the form
where C(`) = B(`)V , e t = V ¡1 u t and § = V V 0 . This orthogonal decomposition is not unique since for any orthonormal matrix Q; QQ
This multiplicity is well known to arise when the Choleski decomposition of § (V is lower triangular) is employed. It also arises in other statistical decompositions, for example, one of the form § = P DP 0 = V V 0 where P is a matrix of eigenvectors, D is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues on the main diagonal and V = P D 1 2 , which is the one employed here. Under the assumption of orthogonal shocks, the impulse response of each variable to any shock is given by the coe±cients of the vector of lag polynomials C(`)®, where ® satis¯es ® 0 ® = 1.
Theory imposes sign restrictions on the cross-correlation function of certain variables in response to shocks. The cross correlations function of Y it and Y jt+r ; r = 0; §1; §2; : : : is
where E indicates unconditional expectations and C h the h-row of C(`). Hence, the pairwise cross correlation conditional on the particular shock de¯ned by ® is
whose sign only depends on the sign of (C(`) i ®)(C j (`+ r)®), the cross product of the impulse responses of variables i; j at lag r to the shock. Hence, given one particular orthogonal representation, one can easily calculate the cross product of impulse responses for the variables of interest in response to the shocks and check if they conform to the sign required by theory at any lag r. The algorithm we use to search the space of orthogonal decompositions to extract structural shocks which have a reasonable economic interpretation, consists of three steps. First, we parametrize the space of decompositions and for each possible one we check if the shocks we have constructed have an economic interpretation. To parametrize the space we use a result of Press et al (1997) which shows that a matrix of eigenvectors can be decomposed into the product of orthonormal rotation matrices of the form Q m;n (µ) = Second, if some decompositions produce at least one shock which is not interpretable economically, we discard them. Third, among the decompositions which produce four interpretable shocks, we sequentially eliminate candidates by making sign restrictions more stringent. Thus, for example, suppose that when one considers only sign restrictions at r = 0 one obtains three candidate decompositions which identify all four shocks. Then, among these three candidates, we choose the one that satis¯es the sign restrictions also at r = §1; §2, etc. The results we present are obtained using sign restrictions at r = 0 only. 
